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Ken Inglis (ed.), Nation, the life of an independent journal of 
opinion, 1958-1972.. MUP, Carlton, 1989, *24*95; 
D.A. Kemp, Foundations -for Austral ian Political Analysis: 
Pol ities and Authority, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1988, 
$29.95, 
Although these two books both come from the mainstream of 
Australian liberalism, they represent very different elements in 
that stream. Kemp would agree with the editors and contributors 
to Nation on the desirabi1i ty of granting paramountcy to reason 
in the conduct of human affairs. There, however, their agreement 
ends. While the Nation writers generally believed in applying 
reason to the construction of government policies and structures 
which would nurture a society characterised by justice and 
civilization, Kemp believes that the best society we can attain 
will arise only when we give up expectations of government 
nurture and apply reason to the pursuit of our individual 
affairs. Nation belongs in the tradition of John Stuart Mill, 
tempered by elements of Rousseau. Kemp keeps strictly to the 
single vision of Newton and Locke, implicitly consigning 
Rousseau, Blake and the rest of the romantics to a First Circle 
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presided over by the ghost of Whi 11 am. Nation published the kind 
of rational liberal thought which undermined the troglodytes of 
the ALP and made way for the brief alliance of new culture and 
old enlightenment which brought Whitlam to power on a wave of 
hope. Kemp belongs to the new scepticism of the right which 
seeks ta sweep away the last relics of statism in a wave of 
despai r. 
It must however be said that Kemp wears his scepticism 
lightly. Once values are consigned to the rubbish-bin of the 
subj ect ive, the pursui t of a Ferrari seems as rat ional as the 
quest for social justice or a sustainable economy. This shift 
away from the possibility of either objective or agreed values is 
accomplished an the first page, where Kemp defines all life as 
politics and' all politics as the reduction of uncertai nty in 
realising indivi dual values. From this definition the rest 
, follows: the need for a free market, the denial of any collective 
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role to trade unions, the dismantling of government, the 
restriction of welfare service to emergency assistance, the 
reduction of the arts to the commodity of entertainment. "th* 
rale of the governmentJis reduced to the maintenance of national 
sovereignty, the dissolution of constraints of trade arising from 
monopoly or combinat ion, and the enforcement of contracts and 
public order. The logic is impeccable, once you accept its 
assumptions. It is therefore unfortunate that, in the first book 
which seeks to Uof ima-Jk+re ideology of the new right in Australia, 
Kemp chooses not to argue for these assumptions, which are 
fundamental to his case. 
Nation is open to a different criticism. Like Kemp, its 
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wr i ters, and the editor, assume a logical position outside the 
constraints of the immediate politics. Writers from the new 
culture which succeeded them argued cogently that such no such 
position is possible. At a time when language, the fundamental 
i nstrument of logic, has been irredeemably corupted by power, we 
can trust only the subj ective, the first person account. Kemp 
takes this argument to its logical conclusion by accepting that 
no truth exists outside the subjective, and that self-interest is 
all that remains. His logic is an instrument to implement the 
rule of the subject, but to be effective he has to reduce this 
subject ta aan arithmetic abstraction. Just as Hume, determined 
to take reason to its conclusion, discovered that there is no 
reason, so Kemp, taking the subjective to its extreme, decides 
that t4*e only self is reason. By contrast, writers of the new 
A. 
culture manage to argue simultaneously that only the subject 
exists and that the subj ect is purely a social construct. From 
Utrta point of view, Nation unreasonably privileged reason. Its 
logical arguments for a rational and humane society were merely 
an expression of the interests of the new class of Intel 1ectuals 
who had created the prosperity of the Menzies years but were 
excluded from authority under his hegemony. Nation paved the way 
to the power which Whitlam eventually brought them, -k**3 by then 
iL^fr- TK^°] had been absorbed into the more subj ect ive and 1 ibertar ian _L*rd 
J, i bet* tar-ian Nat ion Rev i ew. This j ournal celebrated the spirit of 
the Whitlam years, but, lacking the cool rationalism of its 
predecessor, could not contribute the cool analysis the new 
government needed to keep its hubris in check. 
In Kemp's ideal world, the hubris of the over-powerful 
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will always meet its nemesis in the market place. Although he 
admits that the market will never be completely equitable, and 
needs the checks and balances provided by representative 
democracy and the rule of law through a federal constitution, he 
argues that only a market allowing the free exchange of property 
and the benefits accruing from it can individuals maintain a 
degree of autonomy against the power of governments, corporations 
and trade unions. 
The problem with this ideal world is that, despite the 
objective stance of the political scientist, it is a purely 
ideological construct. Kemp himself acknowledges that his work, 
1 ike any other, is an intervention in the political process, 
designed to increase his own autonomy and reduce the power of 
those who seek to encroach an i t. He does not, however, take 
this acknowledgement to the extent of admitting either his own 
position as a -'member of the new class of apparatchiks, a 
professor dec id ing curr icula, a political advisor determi ni ng the 
agenda, jar a parliamentary candidate acting to make his ideals 
prevail. These involvements in fact add to the authority of his 
writing, part icularly wyhen he desc ibes the evolution and 
function of the role of ministerial advisor. Kemp, however, 
chooses to omit any reference to the part he himself played in 
this process, claiming instead the deceptive authority of the 
expert rather than the real authority he has of observant 
participant. 
Kemp's decision to write in the voice of the impartial 
academic conceals the real experience and passion which give his 
book so much of its value. He has a genuine hatred for t^he 
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stup idities of unions, the tyranny of governments, 4^ the 
obf use at ions of bureaucrailces which interfere with the ability of 
individual citizens to get an with their own lives. Or rathVer, 
>uth the possibility of the citizen to get an with his life. 
K^mp acknolwedges that the politics of authority and^autanomy .ami 
5x11 hnni t«y pervade all par 
tn hi e wi re, but he does not quest ion the rights of parents to 
domi nate their children, ar consider whether the supposedly 
equi table distribution of power and i ncome i n Australia may 
exclude mast wamen. Feminists appear in his analysis only as an 
example of a pressure group outside the proper economic 
framework. 
The choice of author ial voice, and the framework of 
supposed economic rationalism, are part of the book's implicit 
claim to be »HIT." the definitive of the problem of politics in 
A:jst~alia. This claim rests on its opening, and restrictive, 
definition af politics as the reduction of uncertainty in the 
pursuit of peronsal values. This reduction is then considered 
in the context of an uncha/nging conf1ict between autonomy and 
author i ty. We want autonomy to pursue our values, but accept 
author i ty if it reduces uncertai nty. As individuals, we try to 
use our posi t ions of power to extend our autonomy, and are thus 
caught up in the constant attempt to capture authority from 
others in order to pursue our own ends. Kemp aHpl ies this 
^ £rwj 
analysis, often with illuminating effect, to every level of 
A 
authority, from the crown to the courts to parlimant, business 
A 
and the unions. As a heuristic device, it works brillinitly tofll 
enable hijim to describe the practicalities of politics as they 
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apply to elections, parliamentary leadership and government. As 
a hermeneuties, it is fatally flawed by its attempt to reduce 
human political motives to a calculus of advantage. 
Th is attempt b1inds Kemp to his own mot ives, which appear 
to be a distrust of authority and a belief in both the right and 
the power of ind ividuaIs to decide their own fate. He quite 
properly assumes the agreement of his readers with this right, 
but avoids engaging in the question of power. His argument deals 
A 
only with the way i nst itut ions exere ise power against 
individuals, or with the way individual interests usurp the power 
of i nviduals. Nowhere does he engage wi th the issue pi ther of 
A 
the way institutions, such as trade unions, enlarge the power of 
individuals, and he seems completely unaware of the way in which 
collective action, the satisfaction of working with others in a 
common cause, can itself be an i nd ividua1 value. His book thus 
excludes from consideration the whole fields of the arts and of 
p1 ay, and most of sport, 
These exclusions lead to greater problems. Somet imes these 
are mere errors of fact, as when he describes the unions of 
"secondary" teachers as "among the largest and most powerful in 
the country" (p.383). Sometimes they lead to misrepresentation, 
as when he cites Creighton Burns's worries about the wide 
business interests of the proprietors of The Age as an argument 
against government (pp.386-7). Sometimes they are tautologies 
masquerading as axioms, as when he states that "In a free market 
erap1oyment opportun ity is best ach i eved by act ian ta advance the 
compet i t ive prospects of the enterprise and its prof itabi1ity" 
(p.397). As he has already defined free market to exclude any 
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other typ£ of action, the conclusion inevitably follows, but it 
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does not tell us whether emplyment, or the share of emplayeees in 
the product, will actually increase. From this point of view, 
unions inevitably represent a restraint on the free market, and 
are thus a bad thing. Kemp does not, however, attempt to show 
why j oint-stock companies are not similarly a restraint on trade. 
(kr**A.cj «*U W<v>ci ikjij 
^Xbjey were necessary to increase investment, just as the 
resumption of common lands was necessary to increase product ion. 
He does not stop to consider whether other measures, such as the 
enfranchisement of the common people, were available to reach the 
same ends, nor does he seem to reali ze that both these examples 
contradict his argument for property rights and a free market. 
This refusal to take alternatives seriously marrs an 
otherwise acute critique of the theory and practice of trade 
unions in Australia. Kemp rightly points out how the unions, by 
pursuing a narrow sectional interest which does not necessarily 
represent even the views of their members, risk destroying the 
public consensus on which ultimately they rely for their 
authority. He applies this analysis particularly to the 
teachers* unions, which he shows have consistently pursued a set 
of values which are denied by the majority of the parents who 
are ultimately their clients. He then generalizes from this to 
argue that no union has ever shown any interest in "policies 
contributing to greater flexibility in the society, and thus to 
innovation, change and adaptibi1ity" (p.412). Yet the reason 
teachers* unions have diverged from the general consensus over 
the last twenty years if precisely becupse they have sought a 
greater flexibility which, for the same period, the conservative 
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farces have apposed. Kemp's claims about standards in education 
-tic. y 
and accountability of teachers merely repeat -±h\o reactionary 
drivel- tff Co^^y/J'*^- C*rvxnt4*jr#- *« , 
Even in his own terms, his argument that unions do not 
want change does not stand up. He cites the "ideological 
publications of the Australian Metal Workers Union" as an example 
of union leaderships being ahead of the thinking of their members 
(p.393) , but appears not to notice that these publicat ions 
advocate the kind of industrial restructuring he advocates 
elsewhere. Nor does he recognize the Accord as an examp le of 
innovative union thinking, but cites it as an example of the 
A 
improper use of power by uni ons and government. Instead of 
examining the contradiction between th is kind of economic 
pIanning and the government's simultaneous dergulat ion of 
finance, he blames the Accord, and government spending, kit-r 
Australia's overseas debt. At no time does he examine the 
propensity of private business to barrow overseas in order ta 
+-i~a»e-rTe its own specul at i on and monopol i sat ion. 
The problem seems to be that for Kemp any suggestion 
emanating from a union is 4n mil u 11 > because their claim to 
collective authority is, as he demonstrates, flawed. Similarly, 
he shows the difficulties of holding the managers of public 
enterprises to accountability for their actions. But he makes no 
similarly rigorous examination of the claims to col Iective 
OH 
authority eW management. He does glance at the separation of 
ownwersh i p from control, but he does not ask how it is possible 
for the managers of a business to manoeuvre themselves into a 
very prof itable ownership. He does not consider the role of 
8 
Liberal ism 
collectives like the mutual asssurance societies, and the way 
their managers have usurped power from their contributors and 
used it to insulate other corporate managers from public 
scrutiny. Had he asked these questions, he may well have been 
forced to conclude that, for all their failings, public art* 
^»1lgcti ue enterprises are mare accountable than private. But 
this would have destroyed his argument. 
The issue Kemp's book raises is how, given the 
uncertainty and self-contradiction of the community values he 
UK 
cites, any democrat ic government can sat isfy either i ts 
supporters &r the generality of the Australian electorate. 
Implicitly, Kemp abandons this question and leaves it to the 
market place of the electorate, although he gives an i1luminating 
analysis of the way the electorate can be mamipulated into 
conniving at the destruction of i ts own hopes. It is this 
despair of rationality which marks him as one of the new right 
and so distinguishes him from the 1iberal trad it ion he seeks to 
capture. This tradition has, admittedly, been weak in Australian 
poli tics, which have more commonly veered between the lazy 
conformism of a Menzies and the moral absolutism of destructive 
zealots like Bjelke Petersen or the H.R.Nicholls Society, praised 
by David Kemp. The record of Nation shows there is another way. 
Ttre fortnightly journal of opinion and rrpnr t nnr , fitnt 1 nn , 
was held together by no ideology apart from a common commitment 
to the importance of ideas. Its contributors ranged from genuine 
conservatives 1 ike Geoffrey Fairbairn to turbulent communists 
like Judah Waten. But this conversation of so many voices was 
based an the assumption that freedom depended on rationality, and 
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procured the practical effects, which no journal dependent on the 
market place rather than on the commitment of its owner and 
contributors could do, of changing the intellectual climate of 
Austrlia. Nation's competitor, the Observer, and its successor, 
/\ 
The Builetin, brought together a similar array of voices, but 
they were, and are, subj ect to the whims of a propr ietor with 
strong views and wide business interests, and so can never 
provide the free and dispassionate analysis that Nation brought 
far an al1-too-short fourteen years. Re-reading this selection 
reminds us not only of what we have lost in its demise, but of 
how pertinent so many of its contributions remain. 
Take, for example, Ken Inglis*s 1959 article on the 
Rupert Stuart case. The recent book by Alex Castles on the law 
in South Australia ident ifies this as a watershed in the 
development of that state's legal systems from a reliance on 
colonial and ^patriarchal precedents to an awareness of 
C 
contemporary society. Inglis's acount, read in conjunction with 
A 
reports of the enqui ry into Abor i gi nal deaths i n custody, reminds 
us of haw far as a society we still have to go. Articles like 
Hugh Stretton's on universi t ies or Tom Fitzgerald's on 
manufacturing and protection remain as relevant, and as unheeded, 
today as when they were written. At the same time, the 
continuing note in the edi tor ials of frustration at poitical 
debate and the lack of political thought reminds us of the 
i ntel1ectual in/ertia which blanketed the yeazrs of Menzies 
government. 
Ken Ingli/s, the editor provides a general introduction 
Ky 
to the book and introductory remarks to each chronological 
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sect ion. Together, these provide not only a history of the 
journal but a biographical tribute to the two remarkable men, Tom 
Fitzgerald and George Munster, who created and sustained it. 
Their values were rock steady, but they never obtained any 
certainty in achieving them, either in their own journal nor in 
the daily papers to which they both made distinguished 
contr i but ions. Both their values and thei r achievements lie 
quite outside the scope of Kemp's narrowly rationalistic view of 
the world. 
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